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PONZI SCHEMES AND LITIGATION RISKS: WHAT
EVERY FINANCIAL SERVICES COMPANY
SHOULD KNOW
KENNETH C. JOHNSTON,* KELLIE M. JOHNSON,** AND JOSEPH
HUMMEL***

A.

I. INTRODUCTION

As the current economic recession continues, the financial
community continues to learn about many Ponzi schemes and
other frauds that proliferated during recent years. Ponzi scheme
investigations now make up twenty-one percent of the SEC's
enforcement workload, compared with seventeen percent in 2008
and nine percent in 2005.1 This article focuses on the litigation
risks that financial institutions may encounter in the wake of a
collapsed Ponzi scheme.
Part II of this article reviews the history of Ponzi schemes
perpetrated in the twenty-first century.2 Part III analyzes potential
claims against financial institutions in Ponzi scheme suits, which
generally include breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, negligent
misrepresentation, fraudulent transfers, as well as aiding and
abetting fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and Blue Sky violations.'
To provide a meaningful overview from a national perspective,
Part III of this article identifies and discusses state and federal laws
and court decisions without attempting to reconcile any splits in
authority. In Part IV, the authors survey recent trends in Ponzi
scheme and investment fraud litigation against financial

Mr. Johnston is a Director atKane Russell Coleman & Logan PC in Dallas, Texas.
Ms. Johnson is an Associate at Kane Russell Coleman & Logan PC in Dallas,
Texas.
*** Mr. Hummel is an Associate at Kane Russell Coleman & Logan PC in Dallas,
Texas.
1. Curt Anderson, Ponzi Schemes' Collapses Nearly Quadrupled in '09,
LAW.COM, Dec. 29, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202437299784
2. See infra Part II, pp. 30-34.
3. See infra Part III, pp. 34-42.
*
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institutions and examine these trends in the context of financial
institutions that knowingly participate in or facilitate Ponzi
schemes, as well as those that unwittingly conducted business with
businesses that later proved to be Ponzi schemes.4 Part IV also
includes a discussion of fraudulent transfer litigation activity in the
fraudulent transfer context.5 Finally, Part V identifies proposed
federal legislation that could abrogate the Supreme Court's
holding in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. ScientificAtlanta, Inc.,6 which severely restricted aiding and abetting claims
in the context of Ponzi scheme liability. If enacted, the legislation
could reopen the door to litigation against financial institutions
and others who may unwittingly participate in such a scheme.
II. HISTORY OF PONZI SCHEMES
A Ponzi scheme is generally a fraudulent investment
scheme whereby an operator makes payments to early investors
with money received from new investors.8 Ponzi scheme operators
promise original investors abnormally high or fast returns, often by
suggesting that they use a unique strategy or investment
mechanism.9 The Ponzi scheme operators repay the original
investors with later investments creating the illusion that they have
fulfilled their promise of rapid success.' ° This attracts new
investors." Inevitably, the Ponzi scheme operator is unable to
recruit new investors to fund the original investors' payment

4. See infra Part IV, pp. 43-53; see also Wayne E. Baker & Robert R. Faulkner,
Diffusion of Fraud: Intermediate Economic Crime and Investor Dynamics, 41
CRIMINOLOGY 1173, 1174 (2003) (explaining that, while many Ponzi schemes are
planned, created, and designed from inception to defraud investors, other business
enterprises only become fraudulent after years of legitimate operation. Unlike the
traditional "pre-planned [Ponzi] frauds," "intermediate frauds" occur when
fraudulent acts are committed by or as part of a legitimate business).
5. See infra pp. 48-51.
6. 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
7. See infra Part V, pp. 53-56.
8. In re United Energy Corp., 944 F.2d 589, 590 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991). See generally
Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1924) (describing Charles Ponzi's original
pyramid scheme).
9. In re United Energy Corp., 944 F.2d at 590 n.1.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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returns, and the Ponzi scheme collapses leaving
all current
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scheme.
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A.

The Origin of Ponzi Schemes

Ponzi schemes are named after an early twentieth century
scam orchestrated by Charles Ponzi." Between 1919 and 1921,
Ponzi pretended to buy and sell international postal reply coupons
in different markets and solicited thousands of Bostonians to
invest in his fraudulent operation. 4 He accumulated 40,000
investors by promising fifty-percent returns in forty-five days. 5
But rather than paying the investors from actual profits, Ponzi paid
them from new investors' investments. 16 Eventually the well of
new investors ran dry and the scam failed, but not before Ponzi
made millions of dollars. Today, Charles Ponzi's legacy lives on,
and the label "Ponzi" attaches to any scheme that involves a
fraudster who uses money from later investors to repay earlier
investors in whole or in part.
B.

Recent High Profile Ponzi Schemes

Fraudsters have used Ponzi schemes to defraud innocent
investors for decades, but in recent years, Ponzi scheme operators
have orchestrated larger and more sophisticated schemes. 8 In
2008, authorities uncovered the largest Ponzi scheme in history
orchestrated by Bernard L. Madoff.' 9 A former chairman of the
12. See Cunningham, 265 U.S. at 8-9.
13. See id. at 7-8.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 7-9.
16. Id. at 8.
17. Id. at 9.
18. Del Quentin Wilber, Economic Downturn Accelerates Collapse of Ponzi
Schemes, WASH. POST, Jun. 12, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/11/AR20090611039 93.html ("As recently as
a few decades ago, most Ponzi schemes were relatively small, relying on word of
mouth, direct mail and advertisements in magazines. They generally burned out after
two or three years. But through the Internet and modern communications, Ponzi
schemes have grown in size, scope and sophistication.").
19. Joshua Brockman, Q&A: Madoff Case Puts Spotlight on SEC, NAT'L PUB.
RADIo, Dec. 17, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=98272
825.
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NASDAQ exchange, he founded Bernard L. Madoff Investment
Securities, LLC (Madoff Investments) to facilitate his Ponzi
scheme. 20 Despite many years of success, the precipitous downturn
in the economy and the stock market collapse caused Madoff's
scheme to unravel in December 2008.21 The authorities arrested
Madoff on December 11, 2008, for operating a $65 billion Ponzi
scheme since at least the 1990s and possibly for more than thirty
years. 22
Robert Allen Stanford allegedly operated another highprofile Ponzi scheme through his company, the Stanford Financial
Group. 23 Stanford solicited investments totaling as much as $8
billion based on high-yield certificates of deposit issued by the
Stanford Financial Group's bank in Antigua.24 Each month, along
with his former college roommate, James Davis, Stanford allegedly
set a predetermined rate of return for the certificates.2 Then,
Stanford's accountants "reverse-engineered financial statements"
to reflect non-existent investment income earned by the bank. 26
The SEC also alleged that Stanford and Davis "misappropriated"
at least $1.6 billion worth of investors' money through "bogus
personal loans" to Stanford for "speculative, unprofitable private
businesses controlled by Stanford." 27 He consequently enjoyed
many years of prosperity before his scheme collapsed. 28 He

20. See Diana B. Henriques, New Descriptionof Timing on Madoffs Confession,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2009, at Bi, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/10/busi
ness/10madoff.html?_r=l.
21. See Robert Frank, Madoff Jailed After Admitting Epic Scam, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 13, 2009, at Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1236856934499065
51.html?mod=djemalertNEWS.
22. See id.
23. See Clifford Kraus et al., Texas Firm Accused of $8 Billion Fraud,N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 18, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/18/business/18stan
ford.html?_r=l&ref=business.
24. Anna Driver, U.S. Charges Stanford With Massive Ponzi Scheme, REUTERS,
Feb. 27, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE51Q66G20090228.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See generally Kraus, supra note 23 ("In Texas, Robert Allen Stanford was just
another wealthy financier. But in the breezy money haven of Antigua, he was lord of
an influential financial fief, decorated with a knighthood, courted by government
officials and basking in the spotlight of sports and charity events on which he so
generously showered his fortune.").
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surrendered to the FBI on June 18, 2009, and was indicted that
same day for operating a multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme.29
While Madoff and Stanford may have perpetrated the two
largest Ponzi schemes in U.S. history, they were certainly not the
first to rob innocent investors. Before Madoff and Stanford,
Bradford Bleidt facilitated "a slow-motion Ponzi scheme in
Massachusetts that lasted 20 years."30 Bleidt promised investors
that he would manage and invest their funds, but instead, he used
the funds to fuel a lavish lifestyle.3 In the end, he cheated 125
clients out of $32.6 million.32 Bleidt has since been sentenced to
eleven years in prison.33
Likewise, Summit Accommodators Inc. (Summit) allegedly
orchestrated a Ponzi scheme with funds that it received from
investors in short-term real estate transactions for Section 1031 tax
benefits.3 Instead of investing the money in real estate, Summit's
owners allegedly transferred the investment funds to its affiliate,
Inland Capital Corp. (Inland Capital), which made loans, including
to Summit's owners.35 When Summit's investors demanded the
return of their funds before the loan from Inland Capital had come
due, Summit financed the return of the funds with new

29. Zachary A. Goldfarb & Anita Kumar, Stanford, 5 Associates Charged with
Running a $7 Billion Ponzi Scheme, WASH. POST, June 20, 2009, at All, availableat
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyncontent/article/2009/06/19/AR20090619000
78.html.
30. See Investors Relive Bradford Bleidt Ponzi Case, PatrickPretty.com, (Jan. 20,
2009, 5:17 AM), http://patrickpretty.com/2009/01/20/investors-relive-bradford-bleidtponzi-case/.
31. Robert Weisman, An EarlierPonzi Pain Lingers, BOSTON GLOBE, at 1, Jan.
20, 2009, available at http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2009/01/20/an-earlier_
pon zi-pain-lingers/.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Courtney Sherwood, Summit Accommodators Case Draws Umpqua's Ire,
PORTLAND Bus. J., Jan. 22, 2010, available at http://portland.bizjournals.com/port
land/stories/2010/01/25/story8.htmlb=1264395600/5E2769061&s=industry&i=bankr
uptcies. It appears that Summit and Inland Capital were initially legitimate business
operations but later turned fraudulent. Id.; see also Karina Brown, Trustee Claims
Bank Abetted Ponzi Scam, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, Jun. 23, 2009, http://
www.courthousenews.com/2009/06/23/TrusteeCaims_Bank-AbettedPonziScam.ht
m ("Inevitably, the owners' embezzlement caused liquidity problems, and when the
company was unable to pay its bills, the owners started a Ponzi scheme, bringing in
new investors in order to pay the old ones, the receiver says.").
35. Brown, supra note 34.
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investments it received until 2008 when it filed for bankruptcy.
The bankruptcy trustee claims that Summit was perpetrating a
Ponzi scheme, while Summit's owners maintain that they simply
lacked liquidity.37
These Ponzi schemes are just a few of the many that have
been recently discovered in the wake of the financial downturn.
Whether designed from inception to defraud investors or
becoming fraudulent after a period of legitimate business
operations, these Ponzi schemes left many innocent investors in
financial ruin.
III. CLAIMS

AGAINST FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

The inevitable insolvency of a Ponzi scheme operator,
coupled with the almost overnight evaporation of fictitious
investments, prompts bankruptcy trustees, receivers, and
aggrieved investors to aggressively pursue recovery efforts against
all solvent parties-however innocently and unwittingly involved in
the Ponzi scheme operator's activities. Targets often include the
financial institutions that unknowingly played even remote roles in
Ponzi schemes. Financial institutions that invested in Ponzi
schemes for their own accounts or on behalf of their investor
clients, and certainly those financial institutions that knowingly
facilitated the business operations of a Ponzi scheme, face the
greatest litigation risks. Even those financial institutions that
unwittingly participated in Ponzi schemes encounter many claims
relating to their involvement. Because creative attorneys are filing
suits based on an increasing number of grounds,38 Ponzi scheme
litigation against financial institutions is increasing.
Financial institutions face claims including common law
claims for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, negligent
misrepresentation, fraudulent transfers, aiding and abetting fraud,

36. Id.
37. Sherwood, supra note 34.
38. See Stephanie Plancich & Svetlana Starykh, Recent Trends in Class Action
Litigation:2009 Mid-Year Update, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING (July 2009), at 11,
http://www.nera.com/image/RecentTrends-Report_0709.pdf (finding that between
January 1, 2007 and June 30, 2009, Ponzi scheme filings comprised 3.5% of all federal
class action filings, up from 0.2% in the previous two years).
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and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty.
In addition,
aggrieved plaintiffs are increasingly bringing claims for violations
of state Blue Sky laws.4° The following list of potential claims,
while not exhaustive, provides a practitioner with a primer on the
strengths and limits of these claims.
A.

Breach of FiduciaryDuty

To prevail on a breach of a fiduciary duty claim, a plaintiff
must establish both a fiduciary relationship between the parties
and a breach of the fiduciary duty.41 Generally, a bank does not
owe fiduciary duties to a customer in a deposit or lending
relationship or to third parties that might be affected by that
relationship.42 Instead, the relationship between a bank and a
depositor is typically a debtor-creditor relationship.43 In an effort
to overcome this obstacle, claimants often seek to prove that a
fiduciary relationship existed as a result of a specific trust implied
from the case-specific evidence."A While a plaintiff may contend
that it "reposed trust and confidence" in a financial institution-for
example, one that acted as the "bank of record" for an investment
program-such "unilateral trust or confidence does not
automatically create a fiduciary relationship; the trust or
confidence must be accepted [by the financial institution] as
well. ,4
39. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint 1$ 58-90, Inversiones Mar Octava Limitada
v. Banco Santander, S.A., No. 09-20215 (S.D. Fla. filed Jan. 26, 2009) (alleging
violation of securities laws, breach of fiduciary duty, gross negligence, negligent
misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and professional malpractice); Amended
Complaint 1 35-84, Fine v. Sovereign Bank, No. 06-11450-NG (D. Mass. filed Dec.
7, 2006) (alleging, among other claims, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty
and negligence).
40. See Class Action Complaint & Jury Demand $$ 47-57, Grossbard v. Sec.
Am., Inc., No. 8:09-cv-00350-JFB-TDT (D. Neb. filed Oct. 1, 2009); Complaint $$ 5455, Purdue Ave. Investors LP v. Morgan Keegan & Co., No. DC-09-14448 (N.D. Tex
filed Oct. 9, 2009).
41. See Musalli Factory for Gold & Jewellry v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 261
F.R.D. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that a lender is not a fiduciary of a debtor and
therefore owes no fiduciary duties, not even reaching the question of whether a
fiduciary duty had been breached).
42. See id. at 26.
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
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The case of Mazzaro de Abreu v. Bank of America Corp.i
provides insight into how a fiduciary duty might be created.4 In
considering a claim for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary
duty, the Mazzaro court found that the Bank of Europe created a
fiduciary duty when it solicited investments "with the written
promise of a profitable retum." 48 The court went on to find that
the Bank of Europe breached its fiduciary duties by stealing and
spending the plaintiffs' money.49
B.

Negligence

In order to prevail on a negligence claim against a financial
institution, the plaintiff, in this case the defrauded investor, must
prove two things. First, a plaintiff must prove that the Ponzi
scheme operator's use of a financial institution created a duty
between the defrauded investor and the financial institution.
Second, a plaintiff must prove that the financial institution
breached that duty. ° As a threshold matter, a court must decide as
a matter of law whether such a legal duty exists between the
parties.51 Courts consider the foreseeability and likelihood of
injury, the social utility of the financial institution's conduct, the
gravity of the burden placed on the financial institution to guard
against injury, and the consequences of imposing such a burden. 2
46. 525 F. Supp. 2d 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
47. Id. at 385-86. The plaintiffs sued defendants Bank of America Corporation,
Bank of America, N.A., and Standard Chartered Bank for allegedly participating in
and substantially assisting in a fraud and money laundering scheme perpetrated by
Bank of Europe. The defendants were correspondent banks employed by Bank of
Europe to "perform basic banking operations" and to "process transactions on its
behalf." Id. at 384. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants improperly transferred
funds in numerous instances to offshore companies controlled by Bank of Europe
and its owner. As alleged, the Court found no aiding and abetting liability and
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. Id.
48. See id. at 394 (citing Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v.
Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 446 F. Supp. 2d 163, 195-96 (2006)).
49. See id.
50. See, e.g., Rozsa v. May Davis Group, 187 F. Supp. 2d 123, 131 (S.D.N.Y.
2002); Trautenberg v. Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Whartong & Garrison LLP, 629 F. Supp.
2d 259, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
51. See, e.g., Calbillo v. Cavender Oldsmobile, Inc., 288 F.3d 721, 728 (5th Cir.
2002).
52. See Graff v. Beard, 858 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tex. 1993); see also Harrison v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1425, 1435 (N.D. Ill. 1989), rev'd on other
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A special relationship may create a legal duty where the financial
institution is vested with a right of control over the proceeds of the
investor's investment. 3 Absent finding that legal duty exists, there
cannot be liability for negligence.54
C.

Negligent Misrepresentation

For negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must generally
prove that the defendant owed a duty, that the defendant made a
false representation, and that the plaintiff reasonably relied on
that misrepresentation.
Similar to the requirements for a
negligence claim, a plaintiff must also prove that a special
relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose existed between the
investor and the financial institution. The failure to prove such a
relationship will likely prove fatal to a negligent misrepresentation
claim. 56 Therefore, in order to successfully defend against a
negligent misrepresentation claim, a financial institution should
focus on negating the existence of a legal duty. A special relationship
of trust or confidence between the parties is evidence that the
plaintiff reasonably relied on the false representation. Therefore,
by negating the existence of such relationship that often times may
give rise to a legal duty, the financial institution can successfully
argue that the investor did not reasonably rely upon the financial
institution's representation.
Courts generally consider three factors when determining
whether an investor reasonably and justifiably relied on a financial
grounds, 974 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1992) (describing the four factors used to evaluate
whether there is a legal duty); Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d
523, 525 (Tex. 1990) ("In determining whether the defendant was under a duty, the
court will consider several interrelated factors, including the risk, foreseeability, and
likelihood of injury weighed against the social utility of the actor's conduct, the
magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the consequences of
placing the burden on the defendant.").
53. See Graft, 858 S.W.2d at 920 ("Under Texas law, in the absence of a
relationship between the parties giving rise to the right of control, one person is
under no legal duty to control the conduct of another, even if there exists the
practical ability to do so.").
54. See id.
55. Musalli Factory for Gold & Jewellry v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 261
F.R.D. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Hydro Investors, Inc. v. Trafalgar Power, Inc.,
227 F.3d 8,20 (2d Cir. 2000)).
56. See id.
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institution's representation: "[(1)] whether the person making the
representation held or appeared to hold unique or special
expertise; [(2)] whether a special relationship of trust or
confidence existed between the parties; and [(3)] whether the
speaker
was aware of the use to which the information would be
, 57
put.
D.

Fraudulent Transfer

The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA),58 adopted
in all but a handful of states, '9 is often used as a tool to recover
funds paid out or distributed by a Ponzi scheme operator.6 In the
fraudulent transfer context, a Ponzi scheme operator is considered
a "debtor" and each defrauded investor is a "tort creditor., 6' The
fraudulent transfer may be a payment to an investor,62 but it might
also be a collateral pledge to a secured lender. 63
Fraudulent transfer liability requires the claimant to
establish the "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any
creditor of the debtor."'M Establishing this in the Ponzi scheme
context is relatively easy because the existence of a Ponzi scheme
operated by the debtor serves as conclusive proof of "actual intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud" a creditor. 65 This presumption exists
because "actual intent" is defined under the UFTA to include66
transfers by insolvent debtors or debtors nearing insolvency.
57. See id.
58. Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act §§ 1-14, 7A Pt. II ULA 13-556 (2006).
59. Nat'l Conference of Comm'r of Unif. State Laws, A Few Facts About the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS (2002), http://
www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ufta.asp.
Id. As of
June 5, 2005, forty-four states have adopted the UFTA, according to the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Texas has adopted its version
of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act under Chapter 24 of the Tex. Bus & Comm.
Code. California adopted its version under Cal. Civ. Code Section 3439, et seq.
60. E.g. Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 757 (7th Cir. (Ill.) 1995).
61. Id. at 755
62. Id.
63. SEC v. Madison Real Estate Group, LLC, 647 F. Supp. 1271, 1279 (D. Utah
2009).
64. Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 4(a)(1) (1984).
65. Madison Real Estate Group, LLC, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 1279.
66. Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 4(b)(9); see also In re Evergreen Security,
Ltd., 319 B.R. 245, 253 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003) ("When the existence of a Ponzi
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Because courts have found as a matter of law that Ponzi schemes
are insolvent from their inception, all transfers from a Ponzi
scheme are presumptively made during insolvency. 6
Essentially, those who invest before a Ponzi scheme's
collapse are "entities to whom the [Ponzi scheme operator]6
became indebted when the investors entrusted their money. 8
When Ponzi scheme operators make transfers to earlier investors
with the presumed 69 actual intent to defraud later investors, such
transfers may qualify as fraudulent under the UFTA. 0
E.

Aiding and Abetting Liability
1. Aiding and Abetting Fraud and Breach of Fiduciary Duty

In order to recover losses based upon a claim of aiding and
abetting fraud or breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must prove:
(1) fraud or breach of fiduciary duty by the Ponzi scheme
operator, and (2) that the financial institution had actual
knowledge of the violation." Additionally, with regard to a claim
for aiding and abetting fraud, a plaintiff must prove that the
financial institution provided substantial assistance in order to
further the violation.72 Similarly, to prevail on a claim for aiding
and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must prove that
a financial institution knowingly participated in the breach. 73 For
example, under New York law, "an entity 'knowingly participates

scheme is proven by the evidence a presumption of actual fraudulent intent is
presumed.").
67. Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 755; In re Randy, 189 B.R. 425, 441 (N.D.
Ill. 1995); see also Quilling v. Schonsky, 247 F. App'x 583, 586 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding
that under the UFTA Ponzi schemes are insolvent by definition from the time of
their inception).
68. Madison Real Estate Group, LLC, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 1279 (quoting Floyd v.
Dunson (In re Rodriguez), 209 B.R. 424, 433 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1997)).
69. See In re Evergreen Security, 319 B.R. at 253.
70. See Madison Real Estate Group, LLC, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 1279.
71. See Mazzaro de Abreu v. Bank of Am. Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d 381, 387
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); Musalli Factory for Gold & Jewellry v. JP Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A., 261 F.R.D. 13, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
72. See Mazzaro, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 387.
73. Id. at 392.
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in a breach of fiduciary duty only74 when it provides substantial
assistance to the primary violator. ,,
Actual knowledge cannot generally be established solely
through allegations about the failure to investigate or discover
warning signs of Ponzi scheme fraud.75 While inaction alone is not
enough, the Second Circuit has suggested that facts which give rise
to a "strong inference" that the financial institution had knowledge
of the Ponzi scheme 1may
be enough to satisfy the actual
6
knowledge requirement. This inference "may be established by
either: (a) alleging facts to show that [the financial institution] had
both motive and opportunity to commit fraud; or (b) by alleging
facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious
misbehavior or recklessness., 77 Hence, "actual knowledge may be
implied from a strong inference of fraudulent intent,, 78 but a
"plaintiff must allege more than [an] interest in bank fees ... to
79
create a reasonable inference of fraudulent intent.
A failure to act does not constitute an affirmative or overt
act sufficient to meet the substantial assistance requirement. 80
Furthermore, a simple allegation that a financial institution held
funds from a Ponzi scheme in a customer's deposit account is
insufficient, without more, to constitute an affirmative act that
would subject a bank to liability.8' Furthermore, "ignored advice is

74. Id. at 393.
75. See Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am.
Sec., LLC, 446 F. Supp. 2d 163, 202-03 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
76. See generally Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 459 F.3d 273, 293 (2d Cir. 2006)
("The plaintiffs allege in detail that the banks knew that Schick engaged in improper
conduct that would warrant discipline by the Appellate Division, but those alleged
facts do not give rise to the 'strong inference' required by the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b), of actual knowledge of his outright looting of client funds.").
77. Dominic J. Campisi, The Black Swans (and Other Cliches) Have Come Home
to Roost: Trustee Liability in a Sigma Seven World, in LESSONS FROM THE "SIGMA
SEVEN" MELT-DOWN AND THE LITIGATION LANDSCAPE 25 (ALI-ABA 2009) (citing
Lerner, 459 F.3d 273).
78. Mazzaro, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 388-89 (finding that a bank's alleged profit
motive is insufficient to infer the fraudulent intent necessary to support a finding of
actual knowledge).
79. Id. (citing Renner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. 98 Civ. 926 (CSH), 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8552, 2000 WL 781081 at 13 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2000)).
80. See Ontario Ltd. v. Zurich Capital Markets, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 974, 990
(N.D. I11. 2003).
81. See id.
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not substantial assistance in the achievement of an underlying
fraud." 2
At least one case suggests that actual knowledge coupled
with continued participation is not always sufficient to establish
liability. 3 In Mazzaro, the court declined to impose liability on
Bank of America for aiding and abetting fraud.8 In that case, the
court concluded that the bank had actual knowledge because it
advised the Ponzi scheme operator how to conceal its fraudulent
activities more effectively. 85 The court determined, however, that
because the Ponzi scheme operator did not take this advice, the
conduct did not amount to substantial assistance, and therefore
liability for such advice under an aiding and abetting fraud theory
was improper. 86 Mazzaro reinforces the idea that proof of actual
knowledge and fraudulent conduct is not enough to prevail under
an aiding and abetting fraud theory. Therefore, plaintiffs also
must prove that the actual knowledge and fraudulent conduct
amounted to substantial assistance.
2. Aiding and Abetting Fraud Under Blue Sky Laws
Plaintiffs are increasingly seeking relief under state Blue
Sky laws, 8 many of which contain the same elements of and
defenses to aiding and abetting liability as do state common law
claims.8 With the exception of New York, most states, including
82. Mazzaro, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 392 (holding that because the bank's suggestion
to the Ponzi scheme operator to "open a separate bank account to 'conceal the fraud
more effectively' was ignored, such conduct did not rise to substantial assistance in
the achievement of the underlying fraud).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 398.
85. Id. at 390-92, 394. This case came before the court on a motion to dismiss.
Id. at 383 n.4. Pursuant to FED. R. CIv. P. 12, the court took all factual allegations in
the plaintiffs' petition as true. Id. The authors make no presumption that the facts in
the plaintiffs' complaint are true.
86. Id. at 392.
87. Richard I. Alvarez & Mark J. Astarita, Introduction to the Blue Sky Laws,
SECLAw.COM, ("While the SEC directly, and through its oversight of the NASD and
the various Exchanges, is the main enforcer of the nation's securities laws, each
individual state has its own securities laws and rules. These state rules are known as
'Blue Sky Laws.').
88. E.g., TEX REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581, § 33 (Vernon Supp. 2010); CAL.
CORP. CODE

§ 25504 (West 2010).
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Texas and California, allow a private plaintiff to sue a financial
institution that materially aided the fraudulent sale of securities
issued and sold in connection with a Ponzi scheme. s9 Further, the
common defenses to aiding and abetting liability under state
common law and Blue Sky laws include the financial institution's
lack of knowledge or awareness and the lack of privity between
the investor and the financial institution. 90
In Sterling Trust Co. v. Adderley,9' investors sued Sterling
Trust Co., the custodian of Ponzi scheme funds, for aiding and
abetting fraud under the Texas Securities Act (TSA). The TSA,
like other states' Blue Sky laws, provides for secondary liability for
both intentional and reckless conduct. 92 Namely, one "who
directly or indirectly with intent to deceive or defraud or with
reckless disregard for the truth or the law materially aids a seller,
buyer, or issuer of a security" may be liable. 93
In Sterling, the Texas Supreme Court placed limits on the
reckless-conduct standard. Specifically, the court held that an
aiding party is subject to secondary liability "only if it rendered
assistance to the seller in the face of a perceived risk that its
assistance would facilitate untruthful or illegal activity by the
primary violator." 94 Although the aiding party need not know of
the exact misrepresentation or omission made by the seller, the
court held an aiding party "must be subjectively aware of the
primary violator's improper activity." 95 This requirement is similar
to the actual knowledge required to impose secondary liability
under common law.

89. Compare TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 581, § 33 (Vernon Supp. 2010), and
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504, with N.Y. GEN. Bus. § 352 (McKinney 2010). The New
York statute does not provide for a private right of action. Therefore, only the
Attorney General, not individual plaintiffs, can sue for fraudulent sales of securities.
Individual plaintiffs must pursue common law claims.
90. E.g. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581, § 33F; CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504;
N.Y. GEN. Bus. 352.
91. 168 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. 2005).
92. Sterling Trust Co. 168 S.W. 2d at 839.
93. Id. (quoting TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581, § 33F(1)-(2)).
94. Id. at 842 (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Id. at 837.

20101

PONZI SCHEMES AND LITIGATION RISKS
IV. RECENT LITIGATION TRENDS

In recent Ponzi scheme litigation, plaintiffs have most
frequently filed suit based on the defendant financial institutions'
knowing participation in the schemes or, conversely, the financial
institutions' indirect and unwitting participation in the frauds.
Claims against financial institutions for fee disgorgement and
unjust enrichment have also been brought under the UFTA.
A.

Allegations of Knowing Participationin a Ponzi Scheme

Plaintiffs have filed numerous civil complaints against
financial institutions that allegedly knowingly played roles in Ponzi
schemes. While many of the claims and allegations may be
considered specious at best, certain common underpinnings exist.
Most claims against these financial institutions are couched as
either securities law violations or common law claims, such as
breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, aiding and abetting fraud, or
aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty. Often, the financial
institution's liability hinges on whether the plaintiff can prove the
institution's actual knowledge of the underlying Ponzi scheme.
1. MLSMK Investments Co. v. JP Morgan Chase &

96
Co.

MLSMK Investments Co. (MLSMK) sued JP Morgan
Chase & Co. and JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (together, Chase)
for "knowingly [participating] in Madoff's continuing scheme to
defraud investors."' The complaint alleges claims for racketeering
under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary
duty, commercial bad faith, and two counts of negligence.98
According to the complaint, Madoff directed all money
received in his investment advisory business to Chase. 99 The
alleged wrongful activity began in 2006, when Chase developed a
derivative product specifically for use with Madoff-related
96.
97.
98.
99.
Chase

Complaint, No. 1:09-cv-04049-swk (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 23, 2009).
See id. 42.
See id. [ 48-133.
See generally id. %T24-27 (explaining how Madoff's business relationship with
resulted in billions of dollars in working capital for Chase).

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 14

investments. 1°° Ultimately, Chase's mid-2008 investment into a
Madoff fund prompted a due diligence investigation, which raised
concerns regarding Madoff's reported gains during a period of
substantial market losses. 1 The plaintiffs alleged that, during the
course of this due diligence investigation, Chase learned that
Madoff's returns were implausible and quietly began liquidating its
holdings in Madoff's funds.'0 2 Despite this alleged actual
knowledge of the fraud, Chase "knowingly [participated] in
Madoff's continuing scheme to defraud investors" when it
continued to provide Madoff with banking services and to trade
with him, allegedly creating "the volume of trading necessary to
create the illusion that [Madoff Investments] was generating a
trading volume consistent with having $7.2 billion under
management."' 0' 3 This alleged ongoing cooperation by Chase
allowed Madoff and Madoff Investments to continue operations
through the end of 2008. '04 MLSMK invested $12.8 million with
Madoff Investments during the fall of 2008.'0°
MLSMK's racketeering claim is based on the trades and
ongoing banking operations Chase provided to Madoff from
September 2008 to December 2008.10 6 MLSMK alleges that, given
this knowledge, Chase "knowingly and purposefully conspired to
violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) by providing Madoff with banking
services that were integral to the functioning of the racketeering
enterprise."'' ° This assistance also forms the basis
of MLSMK's
00
claim.'
duty
fiduciary
of
breach
abetting
aiding and

100. See generally id. 33 (explaining how the derivative product was linked to the
performance of the funds that an asset management group in Connecticut owned and
managed).
101. See generally id. IT 33-42 (detailing the extensive due diligence that Chase
carried out on Madoff's portfolio strategy, and how Chase realized that Madoff's
reported returns were false and illegitimate).
102. See Complaint
40-41, MLSMK Inv. Co.
103. Id. 42.
104. See id. 1 43.
105. Id.
106. See generally id.
49-85 (outlining the pattern of racketeering activity that
Madoff executed with BMIS and DePasquale).
107. See id. 167.
10& See generally Complaint T$ 87-97, MLSMK Inv. Co. (explaining the extent to
which Chase had knowledge of Madoff s fraudulent behavior and how Chase played
a necessary role necessary in helping Madoff execute his operations).
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The commercial bad faith and negligence claims arise out
of the same operative allegations-Chase continued to provide
Madoff with banking and financial services after it knew Madoff
was operating a Ponzi scheme. 1°9 By failing to act on this
information, MLSMK contends, Chase was negligent. 110
2. Padrick v. Umpqua Bank"'
Much like the MLSMK plaintiffs, bankruptcy trustee Kevin
Padrick brought claims for civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting
breach of fiduciary duty based on Umpqua Bank's actual
knowledge or awareness of the alleged wrongdoing. "2
Padrick alleged that four Summit shareholders operated a
Ponzi scheme in connection with Summit's Section 1031 exchange
business. " ' By 2006, Umpqua was the primary depository
In early 2007, the
institution for Summit's client deposits.
Summit shareholders, in face-to-face meetings and in telephone
conferences, "described in great detail all relevant aspects of their
Ponzi scheme and embezzlement," including their business model
and the diversion of funds to an affiliate company and to
Umpqua. " ' The complaint alleged that, despite being informed of
this fraud, Umpqua officials continued to assist Summit and its
and
shareholders by allowing them to use Umpqua bank accounts
116
Umpqua.
to
funds
additional
transfer
to
them
encouraging

99-133 (outlining the different ways in which Chase
109. See generally id.
continued to act as Madoff's bank even after Chase discovered the illegitimacy of
Madoff's investment returns).
110. See id. 130.
111. Complaint, No. 0906-08488 (Cir. Ct. Or. 2009).
112. See id. % 1; see also Complaint, MLSMK Inv. Co. (alleging that Chase was
liable for racketeering, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, commercial bad
faith, and negligence against defendants).
113. Complaint 4, Padrick;see supra pp. 33-34.
114. Complaint 10, Padrick.
115. Id. 12.
116. Id. [ 13-14.
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Allegations of Unwitting or Indirect Participationin a Ponzi
Scheme

In addition to being subjected to liability for what they
actually knew, financial institutions are increasingly facing
litigation for indirectly participating in Ponzi schemes. The cases
below demonstrate that financial institutions often face substantial
litigation risk due to their unwitting involvement in fraudulent
activity about which the financial institutions allegedly should have
known.
1. Fine v. Sovereign Bank117
David J. Fine brought suit on behalf of an investor class
against Sovereign Bank (Sovereign) for allegedly accepting funds
deposited by a Ponzi scheme operator, Bradford C. Bleidt 18 The
complaint alleged that Sovereign knew or should have known that
the Allocation Plus Asset Management Company, Inc. (APAM)
account was being used for fraudulent or improper activities. 19
Notably, the plaintiffs alleged that Sovereign knew or should have
known that the APAM account was not being used for legitimate
investor deposits because: (1) statements for the APAM account
were being sent to Bleidt's home and not the business's address;
(2) the account was a personal account as opposed to a commercial
account, as required by the SEC; (3) Bleidt was the only person
authorized to do anything with the APAM account; (4) there was a
second, "legitimate" APAM account at Fleet Bank that Sovereign
knew about; and (5) there were many indicators that Bleidt was
not using the investors' money for legitimate purposes.120
The claims against Sovereign included: (1) aiding and
abetting breach of fiduciary duty; (2) taking instruments with
notice of breach of fiduciary duty; (3) negligence in permitting
Bleidt to act beyond the scope of his authority; (4) negligence in
117.
2006).
118.
119.
120.

Amended Complaint, No. 06-cv-11450-NG (Mass. Dist. Ct. filed Dec. 7,
See id. 124.
See id.
Id.
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permitting Bleidt to shield his fraudulent conduct from the SEC;
(5) violations of the consumer protection laws of Massachusetts;
and (6) conversion.'21
The court denied summary judgment because an issue of
fact existed regarding actual knowledge. In December 2008, a jury
found in favor of Sovereign on all claims.' 2 Thereafter, Fine filed
a motion for new trial, which the court granted in part as to the
conversion claim and denied as to the other claims. 23
2

1
2. Inversiones Mar Octava Limitada v. Banco SantanderS.A.1

In Inversiones Mar Octava Limitada v. Banco Santander
S.A., a class action case, investors sued Banco Santander
(Santander) alleging liability based on Santander's "indirect"
investments in Madoff Investments.2'' Santander, the complaint
alleged, marketed two funds to investors after allegedly conducting
"intensive due diligence."' 26 The investors claimed that proper due
diligence by the defendants would have revealed that Madoff was
a fraud. 127 Accordingly, the plaintiffs alleged that Santander
should have known that it was participating in a massive Ponzi
scheme and thus should be liable.'28
The plaintiffs based their suit on alleged violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.129 Plaintiffs also asserted claims
for breach of fiduciary duty, gross negligence, negligent
professional
and
enrichment,
unjust
misrepresentation,
3
malpractice.

121. See id. 1.
122. Id.
123. See Fine v. Sovereign Bank, No. 06cv11450-NG, 2009 WL 4250076 *1 (D.
Mass. Nov. 27, 2009).
124. Complaint, No. 1:09-cv-20215-PCH (S.D. Fla. filed Jan. 26, 2009).
125. See id. IT 1-2.
126. Id. 34 (quotation omitted).
127. Id. IT 44-52.
128. See generally id. (describing the many "red flags" that should have signaled
that Madoff's investment operation was a Ponzi scheme).
6, 58-90; see 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2009).
129. Id.
58-90, Inversiones Mar Octava Limitada v. Banco Santander
130. Complaint
S.A., No. 1:09-cv-20215-PCH (S.D. Fla. filed Jan. 26, 2009).
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3. Grossbardv. Securities America, Inc. t
In Grossbardv. Securities America Inc., a class led by Ilene
Grossbard sued Securities America, Inc., Securities America
Financial Corporation, and Ameriprise Financial, Inc. for allegedly
participating in a Ponzi scheme when the financial institutions
should have known it was a massive fraud. 132 Specifically,
Grossbard alleged that the financial institutions
failed to perform due diligence that would have
revealed that [the fund] was a fraud; or . . .
performed due diligence and recklessly and/or
negligently failed to discover . . . [the] fraud; or..
*performed due diligence and 133
came to appreciate..
scheme.
Ponzi
a
*[it] likely was
Grossbard and the class brought claims for negligence,
violations of the Nebraska Blue Sky law, negligent
misrepresentation, and fraudulent "
.34
C.

Fraudulent Transfer Claims
1. Rotstain v. Trustmark NationalBank

135

In the aftermath of the SEC's case against Allen Stanford
and Stanford Financial Group, 136 a putative class of aggrieved
investors filed suit against five banks for their alleged roles
in
1
.137
facilitating Stanford's sale of fraudulent certificates of deposit.

131. Complaint, No. 8:09-cv-00350-JFB-TDT (D. Neb. Filed Oct. 10, 2009).
132. See id. 1 1. The defendants allegedly sold millions of dollars worth of notes
for a medical services company that turned out to be running a $2 billion Ponzi
scheme. Id.
133. Id. 20.
134. Id. $1 47-74.
135. Complaint, No. 3:09-cv-023484-N (N.D. Tex. filed Nov. 13, 2009) (removed
from the 129th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas to the District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, No. 4:09-cv-03673, and transferred to the
Northern District of Texas).
136. See supra pp. 32-33.
137. See Complaint, Rotstain at 1-2.
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The plaintiffs alleged that the banks, while not directly involved in
the sale of the certificates of deposit, acted as "willing and
essential conduits for the flow of money from Stanford's
unsuspecting victims to Stanford's criminal enterprise." 138 The
plaintiffs contended that each bank either knew or should have
known that Stanford's operation was illegitimate. Despite this
alleged knowledge, the banks continued to conduct business for
Stanford and earned significant fees in the process. 139
In an effort to force the banks to disgorge their fees, the
plaintiffs filed claims under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act for conspiracy to commit fraud and aiding and
abetting fraud.1 40 According to the complaint, the banks were paid
with funds stolen from the plaintiffs. 141 Furthermore, the plaintiffs
alleged that these funds were paid to the banks pursuant to a
scheme and with the actual intent to hinder, delay, and defraud the
plaintiffs and other members of the class without having paid
reasonably equivalent value, and
at a time when Stanford was
142
insolvent or nearing insolvency.

2. SEC v. Madison Real Estate Group, LLC

143

In SEC v. Madison Real Estate Group, LLC, the SEC
sought to invalidate real estate loan transactions with Fannie Mae,
Midland Loan Services, Inc., and Crown NorthCorp., Inc., under
the UFTA.' 44 The SEC complained that Madison Real Estate
Group and three individuals wrongfully solicited and obtained
investments from the fraudulent sale of limited partnership
interests in a number of apartment complexes.'

The complaint

alleged that the returns paid to investors came from newlyinvested funds from other investors. 46 The court appointed a
138. See id. at 2.
139. See id. at 3-4.
140. See id. at 23-26.

141. See id. at 4.
142. See id.
143. 647 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (D. Utah 2009).
144. See id. at 1279 n.33 (noting that the fraudulent transfer claims were brought
under the UFrA, as adopted by both Texas and Utah).
145. Id. at 1275-1279
146. Id.
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receiver to take control of and marshal
the defendants' assets,
47
including the apartment complexes.1

Both the SEC and the receiver moved to invalidate the
loan transactions under the UFTA because the collateral was
pledged, or transferred, from a Ponzi scheme.'9 The court,
however, found that the lenders acted in good faith and gave
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for their security
interests.149 The court held that contracts arising from a Ponzi
scheme are "unenforceable to the extent they purport to give
persons a right to payments in excess of their initial undertaking,"
but these lenders acquired the loans from other lenders and gave
reasonably equivalent value for the notes and trust deeds they
held.5 Thus the loan transactions were not voidable.51
12

5
3. Janvey v. Alguire

In a companion case to the SEC's case against Allen
Stanford and Stanford International Bank (SIB), Ralph Janvey,
the court-appointed receiver for SIB brought disgorgement claims
against a number of relief defendants in Janvey v. Alguire'53 The
receiver sued to recover proceeds, including interest and principal
redemptions, from the relief defendants, who benefited from the
sale of fraudulent SIB certificates of deposit (CDs).'
Among the

147. See id.
148. See id. at 1275.
149. See Madison Real Estate Group, LLC, at 1281-82.
150. Id. at 1280.
151. See id. at 1279.
152. Receiver's First Amended Complaint Against Certain Stanford Investors,
Janvey v. Alguire, No. 03:09-CV-0724-N (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2009).
153. Id. "Relief defendants" are not defendants or even real parties in interest in
the traditional sense. See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 414 (7th Cir. 1991). Often
they are custodial banks or innocent investors who merely received or are holding
payments distributed under a Ponzi scheme. See generally SEC v. Cavanagh, 155
F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining how federal courts can order equitable relief
against an individual in a securities enforcement where the person has received "illgotten" funds and "does not have a legitimate claim to those funds"). A finding that
a relief defendant has received funds to which he has no legitimate claim, even if it
only served as custodian, may subject the relief defendant to a disgorgement order.
See SEC v. Colello, 139 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1998).
154. Receiver's First Amended Complaint Against Certain Stanford Investors,
Janvey v. Alguire, 42, No. 03:09-CV-0724-N (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2009).
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named relief defendants were investors, but also certain
"Custodian Relief Defendants" and financial institutions that held
CD proceeds in a trust capacity for SIB investors."' The receiver
later amended his complaint to allege claims for fraudulent
transfers.156
Through his amended complaint, the receiver seeks
disgorgement of CD proceeds from certain Stanford investors, as
well as from former Stanford employees, on fraudulent transfer
and unjust enrichment theories.157 To defeat the receiver's
fraudulent transfer claims, the defendants must establish the
affirmative defense of both objective good faith and reasonably
equivalent value.
As the case is ongoing, only time will tell
whether the receiver will actually recover CD proceeds under
these or any other theories.
D.

Defending Against Ponzi Scheme Litigation

A financial institution's liability generally hinges on
whether the plaintiffs can prove that the financial institution had
actual knowledge of the Ponzi scheme. Therefore, a financial
institution's defense to Ponzi scheme litigation should intensively
focus on establishing that the financial institution did not have
actual knowledge of the underlying fraud.15 9 At least one court has
155. See id.
156. See generally id. (explaining how the Stanford Investors were unjustly
enriched from fraudulent CD proceeds).
157. Id.
42 (showing how the Receiver is entitled to disgorgement because
payments to Stanford Investors were fraudulent or, in the alternative, because
Stanford Investors was unjustly enriched); Receiver's Second Amended Complaint
Against Certain Stanford Employees, T 34, 42, Janvey v. Alguire, No. 3:09-CV00724-N (D. Tex. filed Dec. 12, 2009) (showing how the Receiver is entitled to
disgorgement because payments to Stanford Investors were fraudulent or, in the
alternative, because Stanford Investors was unjustly enriched).
158. See generally Receiver's First Amended Complaint Against Certain Stanford
Investors $T 34-35, Janvey v. Alguire, No. 03:09-CV-0724-N (outlining the defenses
available to the defendant); Receiver's Second Amended Complaint Against Certain
Stanford Employees T 36-37, Janvey v. Alguire, No. 03:09-CV-0724-N (outlining the
defenses available to the defendant).
159. Amended Complaint 1 41, Fine v. Sovereign Bank, No. 06CV1450-NG (D.
Mass. Aug. 8, 2008) (order denying Plaintiffs' Motion for summary judgment) ("To
prove that Sovereign aided and abetted Bleidt's actions, the receiver must show that
it knew of the breach of fiduciary duty.... Similarly, to succeed on the negligence
claim, the receiver must demonstrate 'actual knowledge' of the misappropriation.").
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held that actual knowledge is an issue of fact, suggesting that a
financial institution cannot dispose of claims at the summary
judgment stage of scheme litigation.'6°
Defending against fraudulent transfer claims may also
prove difficult. Once the existence of a Ponzi scheme is proven, a
presumption of actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud attendant
to any transfer from the Ponzi scheme is established. 16 Therefore,
to successfully defend against a fraudulent transfer claim, a
financial institution must prove that it acted in good faith and gave
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer. 62 With
regard to investors, several courts have held that in the context of
a Ponzi scheme, "a debtor does not receive reasonably equivalent
value for any payments made to investors that represent 'false
profits.' ' 163 This rule could arguably apply to a financial institution
that holds funds from a trustee or similar custodian. One court has
defined "reasonably equivalent value" in this context as follows:
up to the amount that "profit" payments return the
innocent investor's initial outlay, these payments are
settlements against the defrauded investor's
restitution claim. Up to this amount, therefore,
there is an exchange of "reasonably equivalent
value" for the defrauded investor's outlay. 64
Moreover, courts do not treat "false profits" as "profits" in
the traditional sense of the word, but consider "false profits" to be
the monies paid out by a Ponzi scheme to old investors to
encourage further investment and sustain the fraudulent scheme.
Thus, a financial institution should focus its defense on
establishing that it acted in good faith and gave reasonably
equivalent value for the transactions at issue.

160. Id. $ 42.
161. See SEC v. Madison Real Estate Group, LLC, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1279-80
(D. Utah 2009).
162. See id. at 1279-81.
163. Id. at 1279-80.
164. See Donell v. Kawell, 533 F.3d 762, 777 (9th Cir. 2008).
165. Drenis v. Haligiannis, 452 F. Supp. 2d 418,422 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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V. PROPOSED LEGISLATION THAT MIGHT AFFECT SCHEME
LIABILITY"6

In a recent effort to increase corporate responsibility,
Congressional leaders introduced a bill known as the Investors'
Rights and Corporate Accountability Act of 2009 (Bill). 167 Among
other things, the Bill seeks to expand aiding and abetting liability
by adding to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 a substantial
assistance standard of care.' 68 Specifically, the Bill provides:
[A]ny person that provides substantial assistance to
another person, with reckless disregard for whether the substantial
assistance is in violation of this title, or of any rule or regulation
issued under this title, shall be liable in a private action brought
under this title, to the same extent as the person to whom the
substantial assistance is provided. 69
In the economic context of a Ponzi scheme, the language of
"scheme liability" refers to claims based on deceptive conduct and
manipulative acts and practices rather than on material
misrepresentations or omissions.7 As of the publication date of
this Article, the Bill had been referred to the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs' and may emerge with
similar provisions or in some form of a compromise. Nonetheless,
Congress appears clearly interested in expanding liability to,
among others, third parties and licensed professionals who are
involved in the economic transactions that are later determined to
This legislation could abrogate the
have been a "scheme."
Supreme Court's holding in Stoneridge Inves. Partners, LLC v.
Inc., which severely restricted aiding and
Scientific-Atlanta,
72
liability.
abetting
166. Scheme liability refers to claims based on deceptive conduct and
manipulative acts and practices rather than on material misrepresentations or
omissions. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & "ERISA" Litigation,
439 F. Supp. 2d 692,723 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
167. See S. 2813, 111th Cong. (2009).
168. Id. § 7 (emphasis added).
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. 423 F. Supp. 2d at 723.
171. Investors Rights and Corporate Accountability Act, S. 2813, 111th Cong.
(2009), availableat http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?clll:s.2813:.
172. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlantic, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 148
(2008) ("Although Central Bank prompted calls for creation of an express cause of
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In Stoneridge, the Court upheld the principle enunciated in
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A.173 that claimants may pursue actions under Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against "secondary actors who
commit primary violations" of the securities laws.
To resolve a
circuit-court split over whether Section 10(b) applied to secondary
actors such as accountants, lawyers, or banks, the Central Bank
Court held that it was not Congress's intent to extend the "directly
or indirectly" language of Section 10(b) to aiding and abetting
claims.'
The Court reasoned that doing so would improperly
extend aiding and abetting liability to persons who did not actually
engage in a deceptive act or practice. The Stoneridge Court once
again refused to find a private right of action for aiding and
abetting, holding that Congress must decide whether to extend a
private cause of action for aiding and abetting. 17 7 Thus, both cases

action for aiding and abetting, Congress did not follow this course. Instead, in § 104
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), it directed the SEC
to prosecute aiders and abettors. Thus, the § 10(b) private right of action does not
extend to aider and abettors.").
173. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
174. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 166; see also Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at
191 (holding that "[b]ecause the text of § 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting.
. a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b). The
absence of § 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not mean that secondary actors
in the securities markets are always free from liability under the securities laws. Any
person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a
manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a
purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5,
assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule 10b-5 are met.").
175. See CentralBank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 175-76.
176. See id. at 176-177.
177. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 164-65.
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found that it was the exclusive right of the SEC-and not private
litigants-to enforce aiding and abetting liability.""
The proposed Bill, as well as a similar bill proposed by Sen.
Arlen Specter, could effectively abrogate the Court's holdings in
Central Bank and Stoneridge by allowing private actions under
aiding and abetting liability. 179 As proposed, the Bill would
potentially expand liability to the lawyers, accountants, and banks
that would otherwise be beyond reach of private aiding and
abetting claims. The Bill also proposes a "reckless disregard"
standard, which could be easier to prove than the "actual
knowledge" standard required under a Section 10(b) claim.8 0
As proposed, the Bill could effectively remedy what some
commentators have argued is, after Stoneridge, a toothless
secondary liability statute. In the eyes of one commentator, the
Court's decision in Stoneridge effectively thwarted the basic tenet
of securities laws, which is to protect the investing public from
manipulations and frauds whose sole purpose is to enhance stock
prices to the detriment of investors.18 ' In holding that secondary
actors-who themselves do not make fraudulent statements-cannot
be held liable for assisting a securities issuer in committing a fraud,
the Court "essentially provided an incentive for companies to
in developing complex fraudulent business
assist one another
82
transactions."1
While the Bill may widen the scope of scheme liability and
deter the incentive for developing fraudulent business
transactions, it may also increase litigation against lawyers,
178. See id.; see also Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 191 (holding respondents
could not maintain a private action against petitioner for aiding and abetting
another's use of a manipulative device).
179. Compare S. 1551, 111th Cong. (2009) ("For purposes of any private civil
action implied under this title, any person that knowingly and recklessly provides
substantial assistance to another person in violation of this title, or of any rule or
regulation issued under this title, shall be deemed to be in violation of this title to the
same extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided.") with S. 2813, 111th
Cong. (2009) (proposing a "reckless disregard" standard).
180. See Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 190 (standard of actual knowledge).
S. 1551, as proposed, would institute a "knowingly and recklessly" standard for aider
and abettor liability. S. 1551, 111th Cong.
181. See Stefan A. Dann, The Supreme Court Narrows Secondary Actor Liability
By Abrogating Scheme Liability: Stoneridge Investment Partners,LLC v. ScientificAtlanta, 47 DuQ. L. REV. 391, 406 (2009).
182. Id.
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accountants, banks, and others who unwittingly provide assistance
to Ponzi schemes or to other securities law violators. In theory,
the Bill's proposed, less stringent "reckless disregard" standard
could subject actors like those in Banco Santander and Grossbard
to liability in common commercial transactions where they "should
have known" of a fraud. Given recent calls for greater oversight
and accountability from financial institutions following the credit
crisis and revelations of gross misconduct by investment managers
who became Ponzi scheme operators, such as Madoff and
Stanford, the passage of the Bill or some variation thereof seems
increasingly likely.'83
VI. CONCLUSION

This article offers insight into the types of claims that
financial institutions may face when a Ponzi scheme collapses. In
the current economic climate, claims against financial institutions
will no doubt increase. And, in the aftermath of a Ponzi scheme's
collapse, financial institutions, whether direct or indirect
participants, will almost certainly face litigation risks for even the
most remote involvement in financial frauds. Recent litigation
shows that aggrieved investors are becoming increasingly creative,
and they are pursuing any solvent entity-especially financial
institutions-that may have played a role. With a stagnant
economy and growing public outrage over the lack of oversight
and accountability within the financial industry, these trends may
become a pattern.
Financial institutions would be well advised to take steps to
review and evaluate their potential exposure to scheme liability as
best they can. A thorough due diligence review of business
practices could help to defend against a claim that a financial
institution "knew or should have known" they were dealing with a
Ponzi scheme. In the event that the Bill or similar aiding and
abetting legislation is passed, such due diligence may be useful in
defending against claims that a financial institution acted with
183. See generally SEC Officials Promise Changes After Madoff Failure,CRAIN'S
N. Y. Bus., Sept. 10, 2009, http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20090910/FREE/ 90
9109995 (showing how the Madoff scandal has led to calls for change and revamped
enforcement efforts at the SEC).
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"reckless disregard."
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In either respect, financial institutions and
learned professionals should be increasingly vigilant about
knowing their customers and those with whom they are doing
business.

